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Abstract—In this paper we conduct a large scale measurement
study in order to analyse the fake content publishing phenomenon
in the BitTorrent Ecosystem. Our results reveal that fake content
represents an important portion (35%) of those files shared in
BitTorrent and just a few tens of users are responsible for 90%
of this content. Furthermore, more than 99% of the analysed
fake files are linked to either malware or scam websites. This
creates a serious threat for the BitTorrent ecosystem. To address
this issue, we present a new tool named TorrentGuard for the
early detection of fake content. Based on our evaluation this tool
may prevent end users from downloading more than 35 millions
of fake files per year. This could help to reduce the number
of computer infections and scams suffered by BitTorrent users.
TorrentGuard is already available and it can be accessed through
both a webpage or a Vuze plugin.
I. INTRODUCTION
BitTorrent is one of the most popular applications in the
current Internet. It is daily utilised by millions of users and
is responsible for a major portion of the Internet traffic [26].
This success motivated the research community to investigate
different aspects of BitTorrent covering performance [20][25],
economics [10][13][30] and incentives [17][27] issues. How-
ever, to the best of the author knowledge, the research com-
munity has put less attention to BitTorrent security aspects.
Some previous works have analysed the vulnerabilities of
the BitTorrent protocol to free-riders [21][22][29] whereas
some others address the lack of privacy offered by BitTorrent
[8]. More recently, in a previous work [12] we demonstrated
that the BitTorrent ecosystem is suffering from a continuous
poisoning index attack resulting in 30% of published torrents
associated to fake content. Furthermore, this fake content
produces 25% of the download events, which means that
every fourth content download in BitTorrent is fake. These
initial results highlight a serious issue that, to the best of the
authors knowledge, has still not been covered by the research
community.
In this paper we thoroughly analyse the fake publishing
phenomenon in BitTorrent in order to understand its real
impact on the system performance as well as the potential
risks of fake content for BitTorrent users. Furthermore, we
propose a practical solution to mitigate this problem. We base
our study on data collected from torrents published in The
Pirate Bay portal during a period of 14 days from 30-04-2011
to 13-05-2011. The 35% of almost 30K analysed torrents are
associated to fake content. This depicts a 5% increment in the
presence of fake content within the BitTorrent ecosystem in a
period of one year between our two measurement studies. This
justifies (even more) the necessity of the research conducted
in this paper.
In order to fight the fake publishing phenomenon, the first
step is to properly characterise the fake publishers and their be-
haviour. The current BitTorrent portals solutions identify fake
publishers through the user account that they use to upload
fake torrents to the portal. We show in the paper that this
technique is inefficient since the fake publisher can generate
as many user accounts as needed in those portals. Instead, the
parameter that uniquely identifies the fake publisher is the IP
address it uses to perform its activity. Surprisingly, our data
reveals that just 20 fake publishers (whose IP we identify) are
responsible for injecting 90% of fake content in the BitTorrent
ecosystem. Moreover, most of these IP addresses belong to
Hosting Providers where the fake publishers rent dedicated
high-resource servers to perform their activity.
The fake publishing activity is time consuming since a fake
publisher needs to manually create the user accounts used in
the different portals (in some cases up to 4 accounts per day).
Furthermore, this activity requires dedicated resources (e.g.
rented servers). This investment in time and resources can be
only justified by a strong motivation behind the distribution of
fake content. We have downloaded and manually inspected a
large number of fake content published during our measure-
ment period and found 3 different profiles among the fake
publishers: (i) a first group of fake publishers aims to spread
malware using the popular BitTorrent system; (ii) a second
set of users tries to attract BitTorrent users to scam websites
in order to get economical benefit from the victims by using
different scam techniques; (iii) the last group is formed by
antipiracy agencies that upload fake versions of those content
that they want to protect.
Our data shows that more than 99% of the published fake
content is associated with the two first profiles. This supposes
a very serious threat for the BitTorrent ecosystem since the
activity of these publishers may lead to thousands of unde-
sirable episodes of scammed users and computer infections.
These findings suggest that new solutions need to be proposed
in order to eliminate or at least reduce the number of fake
content available in the BitTorrent ecosystem. Towards this
2end, we have designed and implemented TorrentGuard. This
is a novel detection tool that allows to identify the IP address
of the fake publisher, thus being able to report as fake each
content published from this IP address at the moment of its
publication. Based on the performed evaluation, TorrentGuard
would be able to avoid more than 35 millions fake content
downloads every year. This means, preventing hundreds of
thousands of users to suffer from computer infections or
scam incidents every year. TorrentGuard can be currently used
through a publicly available website and a Vuze plugin.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
presents the background information. In Section III we de-
scribe our measurement methodology and present our dataset.
Next, Section IV characterises fake publishers, while Section
V classifies them depending on the goal they pursuit with their
activity. Section VI shortly characterises the downloaders of
the fake content. In Section VII we describe and evaluate our
solution to improve the detection of fake content. We also
discuss possible countermeasures to TorrentGuard and their
efficiency. Section VIII describes relevant works to this paper.
Finally, Section IX concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
In this Section we briefly describe the main aspects of
the BitTorrent ecosystem making an special emphasis on the
procedure of publishing content on The Pirate Bay (and by
extension on other BitTorrent portals) and specifically, how
fake publishers do it. This is summarised in Figure 1. For a
full description of the BitTorrent ecosystem we refer the reader
to [19] and [31].
A. Main elements of BitTorrent ecosystem
- BitTorrent Portals: these are webpages which index .torrent
files, classify them into different categories and provide basic
information for each file. These portals serve as rendez-vous
points between content publishers and BitTorrent downloaders.
The publishers upload their .torrent files to BitTorrent portals
and the clients download them.
- .torrent file: this is a meta-information file including relevant
information for the BitTorrent protocol such as: (i) the content
infohash, this is a unique identifier of the content in the
BitTorrent ecosystem; (ii) the IP address of the BitTorrent
Tracker managing the content distribution process; (iii) the
size of the content and the number of pieces forming the file.
- magnet link: this is an URI-like link that includes the
infohash of an specific content and optionally the address of a
tracker [1]. A user can launch a download process retrieving
the magnet link instead of the .torrent file from a BitTorrent
portal. Then, with the magnet link the user can obtain the
.torrent file from other peers in the swarm1. The magnet
links have recently become significantly important since the
administrators of the largest BitTorrent portal, The Pirate Bay,
have announced their intention to stop serving .torrent files
1Also the magnet link can be used as index to retrieve the associated .torrent
file from the different DHTs implemented by BitTorrent clients [11].
from March 1st 2012. Instead, they will serve exclusively
magnet links [2].
- BitTorrent Trackers: these are servers which manage the
BitTorrent download process of a given content. The set of
peers downloading a given file is named swarm. The tracker
maintains a list with the IP addresses and the download
progress of all the peers forming the swarm associated to
a specific content. Furthermore, when a new peer joins the
swarm, it contacts the tracker in order to obtain a list of IP
addresses of other peers participating in the swarm. By doing
so, the new incomer is able to retrieve pieces of the content
from these peers.
- BitTorrent downloaders (peers): these are clients forming
the swarm that download and/or upload pieces of the content.
We distinguish two types of peers. A seeder is a peer that
possess a complete copy of the content, thus only uploads
pieces whereas a leecher does not have the complete file so
that it uploads and downloads pieces.
- BitTorrent publishers: these are the clients that make avail-
able the first copy of the content in the BitTorrent ecosystem.
B. Publishing a content in BitTorrent
When a publisher wants to publish a content in the BitTor-
rent ecosystem, it firstly creates a .torrent file. After creating
the .torrent file, the publisher uploads it to one or more Bit-
Torrent portals. For this purpose, it uses a user account (with
a specific username) created in these portals. Furthermore, the
publisher distributes the first copy of the content by acting
as the initial seeder in the associated swarm. Therefore, the
content publisher can be identified by the IP address of the
initial seeder distributing the content and by the username
utilised to upload the content to a BitTorrent Portal.
In this paper we specifically address the fake content
publishing phenomenon in BitTorrent. A fake publisher is a
user that exploits the BitTorrent ecosystem to publish fake
content, this is, content that is different than what is expected
from the content name. A fake publisher makes available the
fake content from a single IP address (or limited number
of IP addresses) that corresponds to the initial seeder of all
its published content. Furthermore, a fake publisher typically
creates a user account in a BitTorrent portal from which it
uploads .torrent files associated with its fake content. Some
portals, such as The Pirate Bay, remove this user account after
some client reports that it is being used to publish fake content.
Then, the fake publisher reacts by creating a new account
to publish new .torrent files and this loop keeps repeating.
Hence, contrary to the case of regular publishers (that can
be identified by its associated username in the BitTorrent
portal), fake publishers can exclusively be identified by its
IP address. Finally, it must be noted that, to the best of the
authors knowledge, the previously described technique based
on users’ reports is the only one used nowadays for detecting
and deleting fake content.
C. Downloading a content in BitTorrent
When a user wishes to download a content, it first down-
loads the .torrent file associated to the content from a BitTor-
3Fig. 1. BitTorrent ecosystem basic functionality
rent portal such as The Pirate Bay. Then, the user retrieves
the IP address of the Tracker managing the swarm from the
.torrent file and connects to it. The Tracker provides the user
with a list (50 to 200) of IP addresses participating in the
swarm along with the number of seeders and leechers forming
the swarm. Finally, the user starts downloading the pieces of
the content from the obtained IP addresses.
D. BitTorrent Portals, the case of The Pirate Bay
We use The Pirate Bay as the reference BitTorrent Portal
for our study. Previous works [31] have demonstrated that the
Pirate Bay is a key element and the most important portal
in the BitTorrent ecosystem. A publisher needs to create a
user account in order to upload .torrent files to The Pirate
Bay whereas other portals such as IsoHunt [3] use crawling
techniques to obtain the offered content from third portals
such as The Pirate Bay. Hence, The Pirate Bay is the most
interesting portal to be considered in order to understand the
content publishing phenomenon in BitTorrent. Specifically,
The Pirate Bay offers the following relevant services to our
study: (i) an RSS feed system in which each new published
content is announced along with the username that uploaded
the .torrent file to the portal; (ii) each user registered within
The Pirate Bay portal has an individual webpage in which its
published torrents are listed and (iii) The Pirate Bay removes
the accounts, webpages and .torrent files of those users whose
content is detected as fake. Typically, this happens after a
client, who downloaded the content, reports its falseness to
The Pirate Bay administrators.
III. MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
This Section describes our measurement methodology to
identify and characterise the main properties of the fake
publishers (i.e. users publishing fake content). For this purpose
we crawl The Pirate Bay, the most popular BitTorrent portal
(as reported by previous works [31] and by Alexa Ranking
[7]).
The main objective of our measurement study is to identify
fake publishers. Towards this end, our measurement tool has
three independent modules. The first one is responsible for
finding the IP address and username of the publisher associated
with each announced content in The Pirate Bay. For this
purpose, the module is subscribed to the RSS feed of The
Pirate Bay in order to learn each torrent just after its birth.
After getting a new .torrent file the tool obtains the username
that uploaded the .torrent file to The Pirate Bay. Furthermore,
it uses the infohash within the .torrent file2 to connect to the
associated Tracker to obtain the IP addresses of the peers
forming the swarm in its very initial stage. Then, it is very
likely that we can find the IP address of the content publisher
(initial seeder). Specifically, we face three different situations:
(i) The tracker only reports the IP address of the initial
seeder. This is likely to happen since we connect to the
swarms just after the torrent birth. (ii) The tracker announces
the presence of one seeder and few leechers in the swarm.
Then, by connecting to all these peers and obtaining their
bitfields (vector that shows the number of pieces that a peer
possesses) we are able to identify which one is the initial
seeder, and thus the content publisher. (iii) In some cases,
the Tracker announces the presence of quite a few seeders
in the swarm thus we cannot identify the initial seeder. This
happens because the swarm has been formed before the torrent
is announced in the RSS feed of The Pirate Bay portal.
Therefore, using the described methodology we are able to
characterise the content publisher by both its username and IP
address in many cases.
The second module of our tool is responsible for identifying
those publishers that are in fact fake ones. For this purpose
our tool connects periodically (every 5 minutes) to the Pirate
Bay webpage of each known publisher. If at some point the
Pirate Bay webpage has been removed we consider that the
IP address associated with the removed account belongs to a
fake publisher. Furthermore, we also collect the time that The
Pirate Bay requires to detect and eliminate each fake publisher
account.
Finally, our tool has a third module that counts the number
of peers that connect to the swarm of each fake content in order
to download it. Specifically, our tool systematically queries
the Tracker managing the download of each fake content to
2Note that we have implemented a new functionality that allows our tool
to get the infohash also from magnet links.
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Fig. 2. Percentage of fake content published by the top x% fake publishers
obtain those IP addresses participating in the swarm. In order
to accelerate this process we perform this task from four
independent machines.
A. Dataset description
We have applied the described methodology between 30-
04-2011 and 13-05-2011, in addition to 5 days of warm-
up phase dedicated to identify the initial fake publishers’ IP
addresses. During the measurement period we have collected
29330 torrents, from which 10206 (35%) were identified as
fake ones. Furthermore, we have collected the IP addresses of
those peer participating in swarms associated with fake content
until two instants: (i) the moment the content is removed from
The Pirate Bay and (ii) the end of our measurement study.
IV. FAKE PUBLISHERS CHARACTERIZATION
Our results reveal that more than 1/3 of the content pub-
lished in the Pirate Bay is fake. This shows an increasing trend
in the number of fake content regarding our previous study
done one year earlier when the fake content represented a
30%. Therefore, it is critical to eliminate or at least reduce this
huge number of fake content in the BitTorrent ecosystem. The
first step towards this end is to identify who is responsible for
publishing this fake content and characterising its behaviour.
In this Section, we address this issue using the collected data.
More specifically, we aim to answer questions such as: How
many fake publishers (i.e. IP addresses) are uploading fake
content to the BitTorrent Ecosystem?, From where (i.e. which
ISP) they perform their activity? or How frequently they upload
fake content?.
A. Number and Contribution of Fake Publishers
Unexpectedly, we observe that only 71 IP addresses are
responsible for those 4779 fake content for which we iden-
tified the initial seeder. This implies almost 70 fake content
published from each of these IPs in average. However, it is
interesting to investigate the level of the contribution of each
one of these fake publishers. Towards this end, Figure 2 depicts
the percentage of fake content published by the top x% of these
fake publishers. The graph shows a skewed distribution where
10 IPs (14%) are responsible for publishing almost 75% of
all the fake contents. Moreover, this number increases to 90%
if we consider the top 20 IP addresses (28%). Therefore, we
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Fig. 3. CDF of the number of The Pirate Bay accounts per fake publisher
can conclude that a reduced number of just 20 fake publishers
are responsible for poisoning the BitTorrent ecosystem. In the
rest of the paper we focus on thoroughly studying this group
of 20 fake publishers that we refer to as Top Fake Publishers.
B. Location of fake publishers
We have mapped the IP address of each one of the Top
Fake Publishers to its correspondent ISP using the MaxMind
database [23]. Surprisingly, 17 out of the Top 20 fake pub-
lishers operate from Hosting Providers. These are companies
dedicated to rent high-resources (cpu, memory and bandwidth)
provisioned servers. Moreover, 70% of the fake content is
seeded from just two Hosting Providers named OVH Systems
and Obtrix located at France and New Zealand respectively.
On the one side fake publishers need resources in order to
sustain the distribution of a large number of fake files [12] and
on the other side anonymity due to the illegitimate activity
being performed. The usage of rented servers in Hosting
Providers covers both requirements.
Hence, the use of dedicated servers in Hosting Providers
reveals that most of the fake publishers perform their activity
from a stable IP since those servers typically have a static
IP address configured. This makes them easily identifiable. In
this sense, the usage of anonymity services such as TOR [4]
or proxy services seems to be useful for fake publishers in
order to make difficult their identification. However, we have
not found that the fake publishers identified in our dataset
use such services. This suggests that the severe performance
degradation associated to these anonymity services prevent
fake publishers from using them. We further discuss these
aspects in Section VII-E.
C. Pirate Bay accounts utilisation
The Pirate Bay solicits to solve a CAPTCHA [9] in order
to create an account to avoid the automatic generation of
accounts. Hence, fake publishers are obeyed to create their
accounts manually. Figure 3 shows the CDF of the number of
The Pirate Bay accounts used by each one of the 71 identified
fake publishers. A fake publisher use (in median) 6 accounts
in a period of 14 days. However, a 5% of the fake publishers
inject content using more than 58 different accounts in the
same period. This represents an average number of 4 accounts
per day. This result suggests that fake publishers need to
5dedicate time to track the availability of their accounts in order
to manually generate new ones if needed.
Interestingly, we also observe a second strategy that al-
though marginal is worth to report. In these cases, fake
publishers hijack the accounts with a legitimate publishing
history. This provides a trust reputation among the download-
ers. Therefore, this could extend the time that fake user could
be injecting fake torrents before being reported. However, due
to the required technical skills for applying this technique, this
case represents less than 1% of all fake accounts.
D. Publishing Strategies
Fake users follow two different strategies to upload fake
contents into The Pirate Bay portal. On the one hand, we
found users that publish a large number of fake content in a
row (typically around 10) in just few seconds after creating
a user account. Once the account is deleted, they repeat the
same process from a new account. Around 70% of Top Fake
Publishers use this technique. On the other hand, 30% of the
Top Fake Publishers upload just one or two fake contents with
a username. This is a more conservative technique that extends
the time that those fake accounts are active before being
eliminated when compared to the previous case. Specifically,
the accounts of those publishers using the first strategy are
detected and then deleted in 92 minutes (in average) whereas
the accounts of those using the second strategy are deleted in
253 minutes, thus being their content available 2.75 times more
time in The Pirate Bay. Unexpectedly, although the second
strategy offers longer accounts’ lifetime, it attracts only 47
downloaders per torrent (in average) in front of the 84 attracted
by fake publishers using the first strategy. This happens
because the fake publishers using the first strategy typically use
popular names associated to their content whereas publishers
using the second more conservative strategy do not use such
popular names.
E. Strategies to attract downloaders
The main goal of fake publishers in BitTorrent is to produce
as many downloads of their content as possible. Therefore,
they need to offer torrents that sound very attractive for the
downloaders. Towards this end, we have observed that fake
publishers use three different strategies: (i) they assign to
the content a very popular name such as the title of the last
released Hollywood movies; (ii) creating the false impression
that the content has been published by a well-known and
trusted user. For this purpose, the fake publisher names its
content in the same way as the trusted one. For instance, eztv
one of the most popular publisher in The Pirate Bay adds the
signature [eztv] at the end of the title of its published files.
Then, some fake publishers also add this signature to the title
of their fake content; (iii) presenting attractive performance
statistics (i.e. a high number of seeders and leechers) for the
fake torrent. In this way, the fake torrent is perceived as a
very popular torrent by the downloaders, that assume they will
obtain a high download rate in case of selecting that torrent.
To generate these fake statistics the publisher connects to the
Tracker many times using a single IP but different ports. The
tracker considers each of these IP+port pairs as a single peer
and reports a high number of seeders and leechers. The Pirate
Bay retrieves and presents these statistics from the Tracker.
In summary, the fake content publishing activity is per-
formed from Hosting Providers facilities by just few dozens
of users. Furthermore, fake publishers are aware of how
the BitTorrent ecosystem works, thus they use sophisticated
strategies in order to improve the success of their activity.
V. FAKE PUBLISHERS PROFILES
After characterising the Fake Publishers behaviour, we still
need to answer an important question: What incentives a user
has to publish fake content?. To answer this question we have
downloaded up to 10 files published by each fake publishers in
our dataset and manually inspected them. Our analysis reveals
the presence of three different profiles: malware propagators,
scammers and antipiracy agencies. Next, we describe in detail
each one of these profiles.
A. Malware propagators
These users exploit the popularity of BitTorrent in order to
rapidly propagate malware among thousands of users. On the
one hand, for some of the users in this group the published
content is the malware itself. In this case, the content including
the malware pretends to be typically a patch for a popular
game, a key generator, etc. On the other hand, a second set
of users use a more sophisticated technique. They publish a
movie with a catchy title. The content has the standard size
of a DivX movie (i.e. between 700MB and 1GB), and even
sometimes includes a second small file with a real sample
of the movie. Hence, the file has the appearance of a (non-
fake) legitimate content. However, when a user downloads the
content and tries to play the movie, it is requested to reproduce
it using Windows Media Player (WMP) in case a different
player is run instead. When the movie is finally reproduced
with the WMP a pop-up window appears requesting to install
new codecs along with an url link from where these codecs can
be downloaded. Of course, the file including those pretended
codecs is reported as a malware by anti-virus software.
B. Scammers
In this case, the fake publisher uses a similar technique to
the sophisticated one described above. However, when the user
plays the movie with WMP, it is automatically redirected to
a website in the Internet. A second variant used by scammers
is to provide a file protected with a password (typically .rar),
and offer the user a website in which the password can be
obtained. Once the user gets into one of these websites, a credit
card payment is requested in order to obtain some privilege
to watch the downloaded movie (e.g. the password of the .rar
file). In some other situations the user is informed that in order
to check he is not a bot, a survey must be filled previously
to watch the movie. This survey results to be a contest in
which the client is obeyed to subscribe for a paid premium
6Country Percentage of
BitTorrent users
downloading
fake content
Percentage
of BitTorrent
users
The ratio
United States 12.40% 10.42% 1.19
China 6.27% 4.20% 1.49
Great Britain 4.60% 6.26% 0.73
Brazil 4.26% 2.68% 1.59
Italy 3.88% 4.13% 0.94
India 3.78% 5.71% 0.66
Canada 3.29% 3.85% 0.85
Spain 2.79% 5.95% 0.47
Austria 2.73% 2.83% 0.96
Poland 2.66% 2.86% 0.93
TABLE I
DEMOGRAPHICS OF BITTORRENT USERS VS FAKE CONTENT
DOWNLOADERS PER COUNTRY (THE THIRD COLUMN REPRESENT THE
RATIO COLUMN 1/COLUMN 2)
SMS service. These websites are often reported as scam on
different forums. An example of them is http://movieyt.com.
We have performed a more detailed analysis of these
websites. On the one hand, when a user wants to abandon the
webpage several pop-up windows appear trying to change user
mind and making leaving the webpage at least bothersome. On
the other hand, when a user enters some of these webpages, a
pop-up window advertising a Facebook group of the webpage
shows up. This pop-up does not react to the explorer close
button, rather, just by clicking on the “I like it” Facebook
button the window closes. This method aims to increase the
trust of the webpage so that users interpret it is a legitimate
website. More importantly, this finding suggests that these
scammers do not limit their activity to BitTorrent but they also
try to capture victims from other popular applications such as
online social networks.
C. Antipiracy Agencies
The two previous profiles have dishonest purposes. An-
tipiracy agencies instead, publish fake versions of the copy-
righted content that they want to protect. This content however,
is not what downloaders are expecting from the title (e.g. copy-
righted movie). Sometimes this content includes antipiracy
adverts. The action performed by antipiracy agencies is limited
in the number of contents (under request from a company) and
time (in the weeks before and after the content, e.g. movie, is
released).
In summary, we distinguish three different profiles among
fake publishers. On the one hand, 65% of the Top Fake
Publishers in our dataset are malware propagators and are
responsible for around a 30% of the published fake content.
On the other hand, a 35% of the Top Publishers are scammers
and they published a 70% of the fake content during our
measurement period. Finally, antipiracy agencies represent
a very small fraction of the fake content published due to
the specificity of their actions. Therefore, most of the fake
content published (by malware propagators and scammers)
is potentially harmful, specially for not technically skilled
downloaders. This represents a serious risk for the BitTorrent,
and by extension for the whole Internet, that should be erased
or at least mitigated. We address this issue in Section VII.
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Fig. 4. CDF of the number of fake content downloaded by one user
VI. CHARACTERIZING THE DOWNLOADERS OF FAKE
CONTENT
In this Section we look at the studied phenomenon from
the victims side. First we analyse the demographics of the
victims and group them per country in order to understand
which countries suffer more from the reported problem. In
order to provide full meaningful results we have compared
the demographic distribution of the victims of fake content
and the general demographic distribution of BitTorrent clients
obtained from the dataset used in our previous work [12] that
includes the IP address of 27M clients associated to around
40k torrents.
Table I offers the obtained results. It shows the percentage
of victim downloaders of fake content, the percentage of
BitTorrent users and the ratio between these two percentages
for the 10 countries with a larger number of victims. If the
victims were randomly selected, this ratio would be close to
1. However, this is not the case. On the one hand, we observe
that some countries such as US, China and Brazil show a
ratio > 1. For instance, Brazil has a ratio equal to 1.59. This
means that Brazil has 59% more victims than expected from
a random process. On the other hand, countries such as UK,
India or Spain show a value < 1. For instance Spain has a
ration equal to 0.47. This means, Spain only has 47% of the
victims it should have from a random process.
Next, we study the number of fake content downloads
performed by a single user. This help to understand whether
there are users that are highly vulnerable to the described
threats. Figure 4 shows the CDF of the number of fake content
downloaded by a each victim. We can see that 70% of the
victims downloaded just 1 fake content. However, it is worth
to note the presence of hundreds of users who downloaded
multiple fake torrents during the measurement period.
In a nutshell, the obtained results suggest that users from
some specific countries (those having a ratio less than 1) are
more skilled to identify fake content so being more protected
against possible infections and/or scam episodes. More im-
portantly, we have revealed that hundreds of users in our
dataset download more than 5 fake content in a period of two
weeks. These seems to be non-skilled users that are seriously
exposed to scammers and malware propagators.These highly
vulnerable users are the ones that will potentially obtain a
7higher benefit from the system described in the next section.
VII. TORRENTGUARD
In the previous Sections we have demonstrated that a large
number of fake content (35%) is currently being published
in the BitTorrent ecosystem, and what is worse, most of
these fake content are potentially harmful for those users that
download them. We have also seen that the techniques used to
remove these contents are inefficient and require heavy human
intervention to: first, detect and report the falseness of a given
content, and second, remove it from the BitTorrent portals (this
is done by the portal administrator). Furthermore, the scope of
the user reports is limited to a single BitTorrent Portal, thus
the content is removed exclusively from this portal instead of
the whole BitTorrent ecosystem.
In this Section we present our tool, named TorrentGuard,
that aims to automatise and accelerate the process of detecting
fake publishers. For this purpose, TorrentGuard identifies a
fake publisher by its IP address instead of its username as it
is done by BitTorrent portals such The Pirate Bay nowadays.
By doing so, a fake content can be identified just after its
birth since we can identify that the IP address of the initial
seeder belongs to a fake publisher. This allows to accelerate
the detection process.
Furthermore, contrary to current techniques used by Bit-
Torrent portals, TorrentGuard removes the fake content from
the whole BitTorrent ecosystem because it reports the content
infohash. Since the infohash uniquely identifies a content in
the BitTorrent ecosystem, a user of TorrentGuard can identify
the content as fake independently of the portal from which the
.torrent file was retrieved or even if it was obtained from the
BitTorrent DHT service.
In the rest of the Section we present the details of the Tor-
rentGuard implementation as well as the performance results
obtained over a testing period of 14 days.
A. TorrentGuard Implementation
Figure 5 depicts a complete schema of TorrentGuard. It is
composed by the following modules:
• RSS Parser: this module continuously monitors the RSS
feed of The Pirate Bay portal. For each new published
torrent the RSS Parser gathers the content infohash, from
either the .torrent file or the magnet link3, and also the
publisher’s username. Furthermore, the RSS Parser sends
requests to the Tracker Connector.
• Tracker Connector: this module is responsible for con-
necting to the tracker for every torrent obtained by the
RSS Parser. The main objective of the Tracker Connector
is to obtain the IP address of the initial seeder. In those
swarms where the list of IP addresses returned by the
tracker contains more peers than just one seeder, this
module connects to all the peers and retrieves their
bitfield in order to identify which one is the initial seeder.
3From 1st of March 2012, our tool will use exclusively magnet links for
this purpose, as the Pirate Bay will stop serving .torrent files from that date.
If the IP address of the initial seeder matches with one of
those included in the blacklist of fake IP addresses, this
torrent is marked as fake.
• The PirateBay Parser: this module periodically connects
to the Pirate Bay webpage associated to the different
discovered publishers. Eventually, when a publisher’s
webpage (i.e. account) is removed from The Pirate Bay,
the Pirate Bay Parser marks this username as fake.
• Database: It stores all the relevant information for the
detection and evaluation of TorrentGuard. For each in-
spected torrent it stores detailed information such as the
publisher’s username and the initial seeder IP address
(in case this is possible to obtain). More importantly,
it includes two blacklists. The first one contains the
infohashes of all the discovered fake torrents whereas the
second one includes the IP addresses of fake publishers
found so far.
• Website Interface and Vuze plugin: The TorrentGuard
functionality is publicly available throughout two dif-
ferent interfaces: a website4 and a Vuze plugin. These
interfaces provide access to the blacklist of fake torrents
allowing a user to verify if a torrent file is associated to
a fake content before starting the download process.
Next, we describe the functionality of the integrated Tor-
rentGuard tool detailing the interaction between the different
modules as well as the configuration parameters. It uses The
Pirate Bay portal in order to identify new fake publishers and
the IP addresses from where they operate. Towards this end,
the RSS Parser continuously monitors the RSS feed of The
Pirate Bay portal to learn about new torrents and identify
for each torrent the publisher’s username. Furthermore, it
sends a query to the Tracker Connector that retrieves the
IP address of the initial seeder (if it is possible). Both, the
publisher’s username and IP address (i.e. IP address of the
initial seeder) are stored in the database. In parallel, the
Pirate Bay Parser periodically connects to the webpage of
the different discovered publishers within The Pirate Bay. If
we find that a publisher’s account is removed, this user and
all its torrents are marked as fake. In addition, we annotate
this publisher’s IP address as potential fake IP address. If
three different accounts associated to a given publisher’s IP
address are removed from The Pirate Bay, we consider that
IP as a fake IP address. From this moment on, any content
published from that IP address is identified just after its birth
and reported as fake. The number of removed accounts needed
to mark an IP address as fake is a configurable parameter
in TorrentGuard. We decided to set up this parameter equal
to three because as we will demonstrate in Section VII-B
this provides a negligible ratio of false positive and false
negatives. Decreasing this value makes TorrentGuard more
aggressive and may increase the number of false negatives.
Rather increasing it makes TorrentGuard more conservative
what may increase the number of false positives.
4This application is available at http://torrentguard.netcom.it.uc3m.es/
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Therefore, in the worst case, i.e. for new fake publishers,
TorrentGuard employs the same time as The Pirate Bay to
identify fake content. However, once the fake publisher’s IP
address has been identified, TorrentGuard is able to report
fake content immediately after its publication. This provides
a significant improvement compared to standard detection
mechanisms. In other words, with TorrentGuard it is not
necessary to manually report each fake user account as the
existing solutions require.
Furthermore, the current existing solutions are limited to
the portal where they operate. For instance, in the case of The
Pirate Bay, once a content is identified as fake it is removed
from the portal but not from the BitTorrent Ecosystem. Rather,
TorrentGuard is a cross-portal solution, that is able to identify
the infohash of the fake content preventing its download
independently of the source from where the user obtained the
.torrent file: any BitTorrent portal or the DHT service.
In short, TorrentGuard is a novel tool that: (i) reduces fake
content detection time since it uses IP-based detection instead
of username-based detection and (ii) allows to identify a fake
content in the whole BitTorrent ecosystem instead of in a single
portal because it identifies the fake content using the infohash
(an unique identifier of the content in the whole BitTorrent
ecosystem) rather than the torrent-id of an specific portal.
B. TorrentGuard Performance
We have evaluated the performance of TorrentGuard and
compared it with the fake content detection mechanism used
by The Pirate Bay during a testing period of 14 days. First, we
count how many fake content published in The Pirate Bay are
identified by the TorrentGuard just after its birth. Furthermore,
we measure how long The Pirate Bay takes to identify these
fake content. The obtained results show that TorrentGuard is
able to early detect around 50% of the fake content uploaded to
The Pirate Bay. Moreover, Figure 6 represents the CDF of the
time difference between the detection instant of TorrentGuard
and The Pirate Bay for these content. We observe, that
TorrentGuard reduces the detection time 60 minutes in median.
Moreover, the reduction in detection time is higher than 2
hours for 20% of the fake contents, and for some cases it
goes up to several days.
Although previous results already demonstrate the signifi-
cant improvement provided by our tool compared to the state
of the art solution, the final objective of TorrentGuard is
reducing the number of download events associated with fake
content, thus preventing BitTorrent users facing malware and
scam. Then, if TorrentGuard was widely used, it would have
prevented almost 390K fake content downloads just during
the 14 days of the evaluation period compared to The Pirate
Bay. By extending this value to a complete year, we can state
that TorrentGuard would be able to eliminate more than 10
millions fake content downloads per year compared to the
existing The Pirate Bay solution. However, as stated before
The Pirate Bay solution is specific for this portal but it is not
applicable to the whole BitTorrent ecosystem. Specifically, in
our dataset we identify around 950K fake content downloads
occurring after The Pirate Bay identifies these content as fake.
Rather, our proposed solution would be able to avoid also these
downloads. Overall, TorrentGuard could avoid more than 1.35
millions fake content downloads in a period of two weeks. This
means more than 35 millions in the course of a year. Finally,
it is worth to mention that even this impressive number is
only a lower bound since in our evaluation we only consider
download events associated to few of the most important
BitTorrent Trackers5 but we do not consider download events
coming from minor BitTorrent Trackers or the BitTorrent-
associated DHT systems.
In a nutshell, our initial evaluation suggests that Torrent-
Guard could avoid up to tens of millions fake downloads
per year. More importantly, this supposes (depending on the
success of the fake publishers’ strategies) up to hundreds of
thousands of computer infections and scam episodes. Hence,
our evaluation shows very promising results to incentive the
BitTorrent community to use the TorrentGuard.
5For instance, http://openbittorrent.com/, http://publicbt.com/ that are the
two major Trackers in the BitTorrent ecosystem
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Fig. 6. CDF of the saved time in fake content detection when using
TorrentGuard in front of The Pirate Bay
C. TorrentGuard Efficiency
The efficiency of a detection system is typically charac-
terised by the rate of false negative and false positive occur-
rences. In the specific case of TorrentGuard false negatives are
represented by those fake torrents escaping our detection tool
whereas false positives refer to those content classified as fake
which actually are non fake ones.
Exhaustively measuring the false negative rate is not scal-
able in the case of TorrentGuard since it would require to
download and manually inspect every single content classified
as legacy (i.e. non fake) by TorrentGuard. This means up
to dozens of thousands of content every month. Instead, we
have performed an affordable evaluation by downloading few
dozens of torrents classified as legacy by TorrentGuard and
manually inspecting them. We did not find any fake torrent
among them. We can state, however, that our tool discovers
all fake contents which are also detected by The Pirate Bay.
In order to evaluate the false positives rate of TorrentGuard,
we focus on those Pirate Bay usernames whose account has not
been deleted from The Pirate Bay but their content have been
classified by TorrentGuard as fake. The first intuition is that
TorrentGuard may be mistaken for some of these usernames.
We have downloaded content from each of these referred Pirate
Bay accounts and we did not find any non-fake content among
them. Thus these content belong to fake publishers that have
still not been detected by The Pirate Bay.
In a nutshell, the performed evaluation suggests that Tor-
rentGuard present a negligible rate of both false positive and
false negative events.
D. Low impact of TorrentGuard External Dependencies
In this subsection we discuss the external dependencies of
TorrentGuard and demonstrate that they represent a minor
limitation for the system.
1) Dependency in The Pirate Bay: We have explained
above that TorrentGuard bases its operation in The Pirate Bay
portal. We selected The Pirate Bay because it is the most
important portal and one of the key elements of the BitTorrent
ecosystem [31]. Fake publishers could use other portals in
order to not be detected by TorrentGuard, but then their
visibility would be significantly affected. As future work, we
plan to extend TorrentGuard to other portals. The requirements
for these portals are: (i) having a service to announce new
published torrents (e.g. RSS or a webpage) and (ii) having a
system to report fake publishers (e.g. removing their accounts
as in The Pirate Bay or marking fake content with special
flags). It is worth to mention, that these two requirements
are pretty standard and widely offered by the most significant
BitTorrent portals such as Mininova [5] or IsoHunt [3].
2) Dependency on Users’ Reports: To the best of the
authors’ knowledge none existing software has the capacity of
identifying a fake content under this context, i.e. the software
should discern if the content is fake or not using as input
the title of the content. For this purpose, we require the
intervention of a human being. Hence, in practice we need
at least one user’s report to identify a fake content and its
associated fake publisher. As discussed earlier, TorrentGuard
can be configured to mark a fake publisher’s IP address after
the first user report (i.e. removed fake username account).
However as stated before we prefer be more conservative and
mark the IP as fake after 3 reports to minimize the false
negatives.
In summary, the previous discussion demonstrates that the
external dependencies of TorrentGuard do not affect seriously
its performance. On the one hand, the dependency of Torrent-
Guard in a single portal can be overcome by extending the
operation of TorrentGuard to multiple portals. It is worth to
mention that the effectiveness of TorrentGuard will be directly
related to the significance of the associated portals. On the
other hand, the dependency on users’ reports is inherent to
any fake content detection system and cannot be removed until
new semantic-enhanced software is implemented. Hence, the
best we can do is minimize the dependency in users’ reports
and TorrentGuard achieves this objective.
E. Limitations of potential countermeasures to TorrentGuard
If TorrentGuard becomes widely used, it is likely that the
fake publishers will react by defining new strategies (i.e.
countermeasures) that allow them to escape the control of
TorrentGuard. Our tool identifies the fake publisher based on
the IP address that it uses to publish the fake content. Hence,
the fake publishers can use two reactive strategies. First, they
can try to hide their IP address and second, they can try to
perform their activity from a large number of IP addresses.
In this subsection, we will discuss these strategies and their
potential effectiveness.
1) Hiding the Fake Publisher’s IP address: The most
straightforward way to hide an IP address is the utilization
of a proxy. In this case TorrentGuard will interpret that the
fake activity is being performed from the proxy IP address
and will banned this one. Hence this technique is not efficient
against TorrentGuard.
The next option would be to consider a network of proxies
such that the fake Publisher can use different proxies for
publishing different fake content. This type of anonymisation
services exist in the current Internet and are commonly used
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Type of connection Average Time Average speed
University 6m 46s 6.9 Mbit/s
University (with TOR) 20m 31s 2.27 Mbit/s
Home ADSL 9m 59s 4.68 Mbit/s
Home ADSL (with TOR) 31m 15s 1.49 Mbit/s
TABLE II
AVERAGE SPEED AND DOWNLOAD TIME OF THE FILE USING BITTORRENT
WITH AND WITHOUT TOR
by regular BitTorrent users to hide its IP address during the
process of illegal content downloads and TOR is an example
[4]. In TOR, traffic from a source (a fake publisher in our
case) is bounced through several relays until it reaches the
destination. Hence, the destination see that packets are coming
from the IP address of the last (or egress) proxy and the IP
address of the source cannot be identified. Furthermore, the
egress proxy changes from one communication to another.
Fake publishers could exploit the functionality of TOR to avoid
its IP address being detected by TorrentGuard. TorrentGuard
would then mark the IP addresses of TOR egress proxies as
fake. Hence, if some non-fake publishers would use TOR,
TorrentGuard would also mark their content as fake, thus
increasing the false positives rate.
However, it is important to highlight that these anonymity
services were not designed for supporting heavy traffic ap-
plications such as BitTorrent so that the performance offered
to these services is typically poor. Indeed, TOR developers
specifically state that TOR does not perform well with BitTor-
rent and is not designed for handling that type of traffic [6].
To evaluate the performance degradation that a fake publisher
would experiment using TOR we have run a very simple
test that compare the performance of a regular BitTorrent
download vs a download done with usage of TOR. For this
purpose we have chosen a mid-popular torrent from The Pirate
Bay (around 200 seeders and 300 lechers, 350,5 MB) and
downloaded it 10 times with and without TOR usage. We have
run the experiment in premises of our University (with a sym-
metric connection of 100 Mbps) and using a home ADSL (with
a download and upload bandwidth of 6 Mbps and 320 kbps
respectively). The results are presented in Tab. II. They suggest
that operating BitTorrent over TOR reduces the performance
around 3 times independently of the speed of the access link.
Therefore, the utilization of anonymisation networks by fake
publishers would severely impact the performance (i.e. content
download time) of the swarms associated to fake content.
This would result in attracting a lower number of victims that
would prefer faster downloads. In addition, we have revealed
in Section IV that the top fake publishers perform their activity
from high speed services. This suggests that performance is a
key aspect for their activity, thus anonymisation services seem
to be a not appropriate option for them.
In summary, current solutions that could be used by a fake
publisher in order to hide its IP address are either not efficient
(e.g. single proxy) or incur an important performance degra-
dation that seems to not be adequate for the fake publishers’
activity.
2) Using multiple IP addresses: The second countermea-
sure that a fake publisher could opt for is using a large
number of IP addresses such that it always have undetected
IP addresses to use for publishing fake content. Next, we
estimate the number of IP addresses that a fake publisher
would need to perform its activity in the presence of our tool.
TorrentGuard identifies an IP address as fake after detecting
3 fake user accounts in The Pirate Bay. Thus, TorrentGuard
marks a content as fake starting from the 4th account used by
the publisher. We demonstrated in Section IV that top 5% of
fake publishers use in average 4 user accounts per day. Hence,
a top fake publisher would need roughly 1 IP address per day
in order to perform its activity and avoiding being blocked by
TorrentGuard. In addition, we have seen that the activity of
these publisher is performed from high speed servers located
in data centres. Hence, these users would need to have access
to around 30 IP addresses associated to high speed access links
per month.
In short, this strategy represents a double serious challenge:
first, the fake publisher should be able to get continuously 30
new IP addresses per month and second, these IP addresses
needs to be associated to high speed access links. This is rather
difficult for regular Internet users and companies.
We can conclude that the studied countermeasures against
TorrentGuard are either inefficient or unrealistic. Hence, the
wide usage of TorrentGuard may lead to discourage fake
publishers to perform their activity.
F. Torrent Guard Future Deployment
In the previous subsections we have demonstrated the enor-
mous potential of our TorrentGuard prototype. However, we
believe that there is still room for improvement if BitTorrent
portals and Trackers get involved in a next stage for the
development of TorrentGuard. In this case, TorrentGuard could
be extended to be a distributed platform in which trackers
would identify the IP address of the initial seeder for every
content and BitTorrent portals would identify the infohash of
fake torrents. BitTorrent portals would provide the infohash of
fake torrents to trackers so that these would be able to blacklist
the IP address associated to fake publishers and eliminate their
associated swarms. Furthermore, trackers would report back
to portals the infohash of every new fake torrent published
from a blacklisted IP address so that portals can immediately
remove the associated .torrent file. The described system could
store the information in a central server that interacts with
both portals and trackers and maintain a central repository that
can be accessed by users as well. Another option is running
a complete distributed system in which trackers and portals
exchange the information without the necessity of any central
server. We believe that the involvement of major BitTorrent
Portals and Trackers in this project would lead to reduce the
presence of fake content to negligible levels6.
6The authors of this paper have started a process to contact different
Trackers and Portals to sense their interest in participating in the deployment
of the described project.
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VIII. RELATED WORK
A. BitTorrent Measurement
Several authors have used real data collection in order
to understand different aspects of BitTorrent [13][15][16].
Different methods of measuring the BitTorrent are described
in [19]. However, only few works have looked at the content
publishers [8][31]. The most extensive study of character-
isation of BitTorrent ecosystem is presented in [31]. This
work includes discussion about BitTorrent publishers, defined
by its username. We demonstrate in this paper that fake
publishers cannot be identified by its username, instead they
are identified by its IP address. The presence of the fake
publishers was firstly mentioned in our previous work [12].
Based on our initial observation, in this paper we perform
a thorough analysis of fake publishers and their published
content revealing their target, incentives and strategies and
propose a novel solution to prevent users from downloading
fake content.
B. Fake content
There are several studies presenting the possible threats in
the Internet. In [33] authors state that 40% of all computers are
infected by botnets and can be controlled by attackers. Another
study [24] reports high presence of malware and spyware
content in the Internet. Few previous works have studied
the malware propagation through P2P systems [18][28][32].
Specifically, Kalafut et al. [18] analyse LimeWire whereas
Shin et al. [28] analysed KaZaa. These authors look at the
problem from the content perspective instead of the fake
publisher perspective used in this paper. This avoids that
they discover more sophisticated strategies as those reported
in our study in which the content is not the malware itself
but includes a link to the malware. Similar content-based
approach is applied in FakeDetector program [14] that looks
for fake hashes in DirectConnect hubs (central servers to which
downloaders connect) and reports found fake content to users
and hub administrators. Finally, the authors of [18] propose
to filter those content with a specific size since most of the
malware content has specifically this size. Unfortunately, this
solution is not valid for BitTorrent. Instead, we propose a
more sophisticated solution (TorrentGuard) that provides early
detection of fake content.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the first comprehensive study about fake
content in the BitTorrent ecosystem. For this purpose we use
real data collected during a large-scale measurement study.
The obtained results demonstrate that 35% of all the content
is fake. Moreover, just a few tens of users are responsible for
most of the published fake content. Furthermore, more than
99% of the fake torrents are associated with either malware
or scam websites. This represents a serious threat for the
BitTorrent ecosystem that must be eliminated or at least miti-
gated. Towards this end, we have implemented TorrentGuard,
a novel tool for early detection of fake content. Based on our
initial evaluation the widely usage of this tool may prevent
the download of millions of fake content every year, thus
contributing to reduce the number of computer infections and
scam episodes faced by BitTorrent users.
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